In any field of endeavor it is impossible to make a significant contribution without first being strongly influenced by past achievements in that field Write a response in which you discuss the extent to which you agree or disagree with the statement and

The statement excerpted above appreciates the differences and subtleties between various types of knowledge work. On the one hand, I agree with the cooperative nature of trend-setting work nowadays; however not all useful and beneficial explorations need be communal. Early explorations of a field tend to be much more tentative and philosophical. Only after a while (centuries at times) does a basic framework of definitions, forms, methods, and tools form, and community evolves; at that time, the collaborative aspect of science becomes much pronounced and inseparable from the nature and content of the work. Once a domain of exploration has become entrenched—as a scientific or demarcated discipline—it is almost impossible to make a significant contribution without being strongly influenced by major achievements in that field.

Only after Francis Bacon and Renee Descartes independently introduced the scientific method did Plato’s deductive forms and Aristotle’s inductive speculations take an explicitly experimental turn. Science and physics began to evolve into their own separate domains; Chemistry, Biology, and Political Economy quickly followed in the ensuing centuries. However, not all enquiries need be scientific, by definition, to be useful; Not all observations need be measured under a microscope, and not all investigations need be peer-reviewed. The early work of so many natural philosophers, though not scientific by definition, all contributed to what we now recognize as the various scientific fields. In fact, philosophy still remains relevant and necessary as a glue holding all the various disciplines in place today. Without philosophy we wouldn’t be able to apply science as a tool of public policy. Philosophy contextualizes the truth of science, and makes it wieldy enough to be employed by the virtue of moral ethics, the truth of personal agency, and the vicissitudes of political intrigue and civic responsibilities. Undoubtedly, the continued necessity and success of medieval dialectics not only show that old knowledge is never completely irrelevant but also that new knowledge does not necessarily have to conform to present social conventions and definitions to be useful. Social acceptance can be cyclical, but significant discoveries advance to the benefit of humanity.

Consider the inventor of the wheel. Could he have discovered this life-altering invention as an extension of anything that had come before? There was nothing existing that operated in the function of a wheel at the time—certainly nothing wild in nature—and only a moment of inspiration and ingenuity could have unlocked the wheel as a tool for moving loads of burden over distances greater than could have been possible with a mule or donkey. And what “field” existed at that time, except that of cattle, harvests, and manure. The point here is that there are instances where orthodoxy is either nonexistent, not yet established, or totally inapplicable, when opportunities beg for creativity. At these moments, social collaboration—or deference in its extreme form—is unnecessary and can actually hinder true and significant contribution to humanity’s progress.

During the 1980s, there arose a social movement against the scientific community in America. Political activists, former scientists, and the enlightened public accused the scientific establishment of profiting from federal grants, of being in cahoots with the military and political complexes in providing interested recommendations on matters of public policy. The construction and dropping of the Hiroshima and Nagasaki atomic bombs, toxic environmental pollutants emitted from the semiconductor industry, among other developments were referenced as evidence that science was neither providing value-neutral judgments nor providing recommendations appropriate for the health and flourishing of the average man. The movement was sudden, counter-cultural, and succeeded in getting the government to make concessions in guaranteeing environmental health. This movement was not only anti-scientific, it was also anti-social, in that it critiqued science as a social construction that itself needs to be subjected to the greater public. Because of the recondite and reclusive nature of scientific work, the intellectual assent for this movement were led by former scientists and philosophers of science very much in the mold of Francis Bacon and Renee Descartes. Does this event guarantee that meaningful and significant societal contributions need be scientific? No. Does it show that true progress need be communal? No for the entrenched scientific community, yes for individuals who recognize an important cause and elect to form an ad-hoc coalition of vested persons who are unafraid to challenge the established consensus.

All in all, I believe the social perspective is an important part of the process of validating new knowledge. But it is only a small part, not the whole. It is equally important that persons be motivated by the desire for advancing the health and benefit of humanity. It is certainly not impossible to make important contributions without deferring to achievements in the recent history of a field. Sometimes success may necessitate invoking an earlier history, while at other times, simple ingenuity may be all that is needed.